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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH,

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

)

Case No. 20010536-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
CLAY Y. STARK,
Defendant and Appellant.
Priority No. 2
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Mr. Stark raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first
time while on appeal. Jorge H. Galvez, former counsel, rendered a deficient
performance which fell well below the standards of reasonable professional judgment
causing substantial prejudice to Mr. Stark. He failed as effective legal counsel for the
following reasons, which arguments are contained later in this brief, to wit: (1) failed to
pursue a pretrial motion to suppress or weigh the strength of the State's case through a
preliminary hearing, and (2) Mr. Galvez's strategy at trial consisted of presenting a
question of law to the jury rather than defending questions of fact-Mr. Stark only trial

strategy was to seek jury nullification for the arresting officer's lapse in certificate to
operate the intoxilyzer (meaning the jury should find Mr. Stark not guilty just because
the arresting officer did not have a valid certificate to administer the breath test). (See
the opening statement and closing arguments of the trial transcript) (T. at 17-20, 106107).l
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). Mr. Stark appeals the
final order and judgment of the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second Judicial
District Court, in and for Weber County involving a conviction of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Whether Mr. Stark received ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr.
Jorge H. Galvez, Attorney at Law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ineffective Assistance. This Court should review Mr. Stark's claim of

1

For the purpose of this brief, references to the record will be "(R. at nn.)" and
references to the trial transcript will be "(T. at nn.)"
2

ineffective assistance of counsel even though raised first time on appeal by his new
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver.
The Because new counsel represents Maestas in this appeal and because we
believe the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal, we will review those claims as a matter of law. See
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998).
State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]

STATEMENTS OF FACT ON THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case;
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment of Judge Taylor, of

the Second District Court. On June 4, 2001, the trial court sentenced Mr. Stark for
Driving Under the Influence, a Third Degree Felony in violation of 41-6-44, imposing
a maximum prison term of five years. (R. at 100). This conviction resulted from a
"guilty" jury verdict of a trial which took place on April 18, 2001. (T. at 114).
II.

Course of the Proceedings:
This matter commenced on April 18, 2000 by Information. The

Information claimed that on or about April 14, 2000, Mr. Stark "did drive or was in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a blood or breath alcohol concentration
of .08 grams . . . ." (R. at 1). On April 24, 2000, Mr. Stark appeared before the
3

Honorable Stanton Taylor and was arraigned. (R. at 10). On April 28, 2000, Mr.
Galvez appeared as counsel for Mr. Stark. (R. at 12). On June 5, 2000, the parties
participated in a disposition hearing with no resolution, so a Preliminary Hearing was
requested. (R. at 21). On July 3, 2000, the court convened for the preliminary hearing;
thereafter Mr. Stark was arraigned. (R. at 23-26). The minutes of the preliminary
hearing show that no prelim was held-counsel had Mr. Stark waive the taking of
preliminary evidence. (R. at 27). Thereafter, another disposition hearing was
conducted on August 7, 2000-still the matter was not negotiated. (R. at 29).
Based upon the parties' failure to resolve the matter-Mr. Galvez
"indicated to the court that he will be filing a motion to suppress." (R. at 29). The
court instructed that the defense was to file a motion by August 28, 2000, the State
would respond by September 8, 2000, and Mr. Galvez was to reply by September 15,
2000. In addition, the court set a suppression hearing to convene on September 18,
2000. (R. at 29).
On the date of the hearing, all of the parties attended to find out that the
defense failed to file any motion. From the minutes of the hearing, the court noted:
Suppression Hearing not held. Mr. Galvez indicates to the Court that a
Suppression Hearing would not be needed. The defendant enters a not guilty
plea to the charges. The sets a trial date of 11/30/00 with a final pre-trial on
11/13/00.
(R. at 31). On the date of November 13, 2000, Mr. Galvez moved for a continuance
of the trial due to a calendar conflict-the State concurred, (r. at 35), and trial was
4

rescheduled for February 6, 2001. Id. However, on February 2, 2001, the trial court
rescheduled the trial to April 18, 2001 due a conflict of its own calendar. (R. at 40).
The April 18, 2001 jury trial was conduct wherein the jury found Mr. Stark guilty. (T.
at 114). But for Mr. Galvez's trial error and mishandling of the case, Mr. Stark would
not have been convicted.
III.

Disposition in Trial Court:
At trial, Mr. Galvez makes his case well understood for the jury in his

opening statements. (T. at 17-20). [Attached as Addendum B]. During his statements,
Mr. Galvez explained that he attended law school in India as part of his education. (T.
at 18). Mr. Galvez explained that in India they don't have juries, just judges. (T. at
18). He explained that the jury would be decided the facts of this case, and that of
"jury nullification." He stated, "The whole concept, they teach it to you in law school
is jury nullification, okay. It's one plus two plus three doesn't necessarily mean the
same to you as yo me. The jury gets to decide." (T. at 18).
Mr. Galvez, then went on to describe what the jury would have to decide
in the case at hand. He explained that the "State can't have it's cake and eat it." He
claimed that the State cannot pursue Mr. Stark's violation of the law while excusing the
arresting officer's lapse in certification to administer a breathalyzer. (T. at 20). More
particularly, Mr. Galvez puts it: (T. at 20).
The State can't have it's cake and eat it. They can't say> Of, Mr. Stark, on the
law, because you know, he didn't comply with the specific rule and then say but,
5

my officer wasn't certified but that's okay because it he became certified later
on.
He then compared the lapsed certification to a suspension of an attorney's
license to practice law. (T. at 20). Interestingly, he pointed out, that he don't think the
Judge would allow him to practice if he wasn't a lawyer-obviously sensing the question
to be one for the judge and not appropriate for a jury.
Later on, after the hearing of testimony from the witnesses, which
consisted on the arresting officer, Jason Talbot, Scott Hathcock, the State's expert, and
the Mr. and Mrs. Stark, the parties offered their closing arguments.2 (T. at 98, 102,
106-112). [Galvez's closing arguments are included in Addendum C]. Mr. Galvez
reiterated his earlier opening statements, pleading with the jury to acquit Mr. Stark
based upon the officer's lack of certification. Particularly, he claimed, "I'm asking you
is the whole testimony by the deputy truthful, consistent, necessarily so? Obviously he
wasn't certified. You get to decide what that means, what it may or may not mean."
(T. at 110).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On appeal, Mr. Stark has met the Maestas, requirement to prevail on
appeal with the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-in this case, Jorge H. Galvez.

2

Note: Mr. Galvez had the defendant testify concerning his driving and his refusal
to submit to sobriety tests. It is uncertain what the point of this was. The State didn't even
both with cross-examining.
6

Mr. Galvez failure to put on a defense before the judge of clearly suppressionable
issues and then present as trial strategy questions of law by jury nullification fell well
below the standard of competent legal counsel.

ARGUMENT
POINT L
MR. STARK IS ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL DUE TO
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF FORMER TRIAL COUNSEL.

This matter is on appeal from the Sentence and conviction by a jury trial.
Mr. Stark was sentenced on June 4, 2001. He was convicted by jury verdict on April
18, 2001 at the hand of counsel, Jorge H. Galvez, whose only trial strategy was jury
nullification erroneously arguing questions of law, rather than only questions of fact.
During this appeal, Mr. Stark raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
pertaining to his prior counsel, Mr. Galvez-this claim is raised first time while on
appeal. To be successful of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Mr.
Stark must show
that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists
a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would
likely have been more favorable to [that party]. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066-67, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Because a
defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of the Strickland test, it is
unnecessary for this court to apply both parts where our inquiry reveals that one
of its parts is not satisfied." State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1998).
7

State v. Mecham, 2000 Utah App. 247 (August 17, 2000). In this matter the record
shows clearly that Mr. Galvez's trial strategy was jury nullification asking the jury to
disregard the breath test results merely because the officer's certification was lapsed at
the time he operated the Intoxilyzer. (T. at 17-20, 110). Counsel attempted to compare
the lapsed certification to practicing law without a license. (T. at 17-20, 106-113).
Deputy Talbot admitted not having a valid certificate during trial, (T. at 48-49), and
then the State defended the lapsed certification by having an Intoxilyzer technician,
Scott Hathcock, inappropriately testify at trial about an operator's certification. (T. at
72).
Meanwhile, this case not only involves what the trial record contains, but
what the trial record fails to contain due to other failures by counsel. Mr. Galvez had
the opportunity to file a Suppression Motion, but failed to take advantage of that. (R. at
31). The record shows that after waiving a preliminary hearing, (r. at 27), Mr. Galvez
requested a suppression hearing, (r. at 29), but then failed to meet any of the motion
deadlines before the September 18, 2000 hearing. Id. Instead of informing the court of
his error, he simply claimed "a Suppression Hearing would not be needed." (R. at 31).
Counsel should have apologized for not filing the motion and requested an extension of
time. Clearly in reviewing the facts of this case from the police reports in this
counsel's possession, the defense should have filed a motion to suppress relying on
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App 1992). Warden is on point with
8

this matter where an officer approached the defendant under the guise of a community
caretaker, and not for suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing. In this matter, by time of
the officer approached Mr. Stark, Mr. Stark was already stopped to fix his flat tire. (T.
at 24). Deputy Talbot claimed he "wasn't sure if [Mr. Stark] knew the was flat or not"
as he passed Mr. Stark traveling the opposite direction. By the time Talbot had turned
around though, Mr. Stark was stopping in a parking lot in order to repair the tire. (T.
at 24). The officer did not catch up with Mr. Stark until the casted Mr. Stark was
already out of his vehicle. (T. at 24-25). Because of these facts, there was no longer a
reason for the officer to approach Mr. Stark "out of concern." Only after the contact
was made did a detection of an odor of alcohol arise. (T. at 25).
Clearly, Mr. Galvez should have filed a motion to suppress evidence
-claiming a lack of reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer relying on Warden.
Because he failed to file the motion, counsel rendered himself ineffective before the
jury on April 18, 2001. Mr. Galvez didn't even raise an oral motion, whether to
suppress evidence or for directed verdict, at the time of trial once these facts were
made known to the court. Clearly this manner of representation is defective far below
the standard.
Other issues counsel should have presented in defending a felony DUI
were that (1) the State provided defective notice of it's expert witness, Scott Hathcock
testimony. The notice, (r. at 44), first claimed there to be "[attached copies of the
9

affidavits for before and after the date of the test and a copy of Trooper Hathcock's
Curriculum Vitae. There wasn't. Secondly, during trial the expert inappropriately
exceeded the scope of the suggested testimony. (T.at 72). During trial, the prosecution
had the Hathcock testify about the arresting officer's lapsed certification. The
certification requirement is a question of law, not a question of fact. See Rules R714500-5 and R714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code. [A copy is attached herewith
Addendum A]. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1953, as amended) particularly requires a
jury to determine questions of fact, and that questions of law are to be determined by
the court. Id. What was counsel thinking when he handled this case? He certainly
wasn't thinking consistent with Section 77-17-10. Jury nullification for the officer's
lapsed certification was not the approach on a third degree felony.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Stark has been unjustly dealt with at the
hand of his own counsel. This Court should either vacate the sentence or reverse the
conviction, and remand this case for further proceeding with instructions by the Court.
Particularly, the defendant requests for a new trial in this matter-Mr. Oliver is willing to
conduct a new trial on Mr. Stark's behalf.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of

January, 2002.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this

day of April, 2002,1

served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF, postage prepaid, to:
Brett J. DelPorto
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. BBBox 140854
Salt La City, Utah 84114-0854

D. BRUCE OLIVER

Addendum A
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions

1
R714-500-5. Program Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, methods, and programs, hereinafter "program",
must be certified by the department.
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or laboratory shall submit an application to the
department for certification. The application shall show the brand and/or model of the
instrument to be used and contain a resume of the program to be followed. An on-site inspection
shall be made by the department to determine compliance with all applicable provisions in this
rule.
C. Certification of a program may be denied, suspended, or revoked by the department if,
based on information obtained by the department, program supervisor, or technician, the agency
or laboratory fails to meet the criteria as outlined by the department.
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall meet the following criteria:
(1) The results of tests to determine the concentration of alcohol on a person's breath shall be
expressed as equivalent grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The results of such tests shall
be entered in a permanent record book for department use.
(2) Printed checklists, outlining the method of properly performing breath tests shall be
available at each location where tests are given. Test record cards used in conjunction with breath
testing shall be available at each location where tests are given. Both the checklist and test
record card, after completion of a test should be retained by the operator.
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a routine basis, not to exceed 40 days between
calibration tests, by a technician, depending on location of instruments and area of responsibility.
(4) Certification procedures to certify the breath testing instrument shall be performed by a
technician as required in this rule, or by using such procedures as recommended by the
manufacturer of the instrument to meet its performance specifications, as derived from:
(a) electrical power tests,
(b) operating temperature tests,
(c) internal purge tests,
(d) internal calibration tests,
(e) diagnostic tests,
(f) invalid function tests,
(g) known reference samples testing, and
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.
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(h) measurements displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(5) Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book retained by the
technician. A report of the certification procedure shall be recorded on the approved form
(affidavit) and sent to the program supervisor.
(6) All analytical results on a subject test shall be recorded, using terminology established by
state statute and reported to three decimal places. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L shall be
reported as 0.237.
(7) The instrument must be operated by either a certified operator or technician.
R714-500-6. Operator Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators", must be certified by the
department.
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a program supervisor
and/or technician.
C. Initial Certification
(1) In order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing instrument, an
applicant must successfully complete a course of instruction approved by the department, which
must include as a minimum the following:
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing.
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. Report Form.
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing, driving
under the influence, case law and other alcohol related laws.
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated tests on the
instruments, including demonstrations under the supervision of a class instructor.
f. One hour for examination and critique of course.
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a certificate will be issued
that will be valid for two years.
D. Renewal Certification
(1) The operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration date. The minimum
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.
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requirement for renewal of operator certification will be:
a. Two hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing.
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. Report Form and
testimony of arresting officer.
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and detecting the
drinking driver.
e. One hour for examination and critique of course.
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the Compact Disc Computer program
including successful completion of exam. Results of exams must be forwarded to program
supervisor and a certification certificate will be issued.
(2) Any operator who allows his/her certification to expire one year or longer must retake
and successfully complete the initial certification course as outlined in paragraph C of this
section.

© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

1
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact by the
jury.
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as well as fact but
they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court.
History: C. 1953,77-17-10, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2.

© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

Addendum B
Galvez's Opening Statements
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He gets to make
inaudible) chose
m^^d

gases, they read

""he^p are neople there out:
c .-. ;

-j.Tment-- gets to m a k e a

:therw.."^ w e w o ., :n' *" ask fcr a second o p i n i o n and
i

t i ic t ,

tl i. ::! j udge

Neither

In thi s case there w a s n o true s o b r i e t y test

23
24

performed.

M y client d i d have a broken 1 eg.

N o t the o n e h e

25

w a s drivi ng w i t h a n d (Inaudible) a b r o k e n leg o n t h e other leg

19

1 ' that he used.

I have some questions and we'll explain those to

2 | you as to whether the tests were in fact offered, some
3

questions as to whether, you know, the breathalyser information |

4

will be presented to you, should be considered by you or should ,

5

be given weight by you because, you know, we can't just have

6

our cake and eat it.

7

it.

8

know, he didn't comply with the specific rule and then say but,

9

my officer wasn't certified but that's okay because it he

10

The State can't have it's cake and eat

They can't say, Oh, Mr. Stark, on the law, because you

became certified later on.
I don't know how you feel, but if I got a letter from

11
12

the Utah State Bar telling me that my license had been

13

suspended and that I couldn't practice law for a month or three

14

months of something, I don't think the Judge, in the fact will

15

not allow me to stand in front of you and try a case because at

16

that point, I am not a lawyer.

17

legal education.

18

whatever, but it doesn't mean that I have that right to make

19

that judgment or to make that presentation to you.

20

submit to you and the evidence will show that similar

21

circumstances is what we have here.

22

ask that you keep an open mind, to ask you to grant (inaudible)

23

considered to (inaudible) of the circumstances and then we will

24

entrust that judgment to you as you decide.

25

much.

I'm smart.

I'm not certified.

I have a

I'm whatever, I mean educated,

I will

That's why we're here, to

Thank you very

20

Addendum C
Galvez's Closing Arguments

:T abov^ , n 8 . We have shown that in this case.
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vy
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We admit
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Wp' r p

* *~e
. ' nere

r.cr aoout tnat.
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tite

c ,"--r:":r:.<-:it is allowed to qo ana prove that re's nui.^v 01 a
DUI.

You can't n a ^

C

v

—:- ^t:
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. _ ^i^,\e ; M - ,,:*

or tnis amount, - : tt . hand s-v

Wt:* i I,

« u1I

_ r+- « y ,

*. • technical rn.an.ioca,

inaudible) 01

.1 1 'jn Hit other

, we weren't kind of playing by the

rules completely, but don't pay attention to that, yen hmw,
you can't say that.
Tf you'd please refer to instruction #28 aqain.
lack of certificati~^ .

- * 1

J

.

.
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' . airect ~r lack

. .:::• 4t upon the test results is an i s ^ e decided by you,
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1 ! okay?

You're the judges.

You are the people who will have to

i

2 i determine, you know, will have to determine do we let, you
3

know, do we bend a little bit and let the rules to convict this

4

man.

He was not certified, you know, and that may be simple to

5

you.

It may seem simple to Mr. Saunders or to me.

6

it's not simple enough to the government that they have passed

Frankly,

7 I an administrative rule that says that you must be certified and
8

we cannot go backwards and say after the fact, Well, had he

9

been certified, the same result happened because then I suppose

10

we're taking advantage of that.

11
12

I want to take you, ask your attention again, to
Section 11.

Today I said at the beginning, you folks are the

13 J important parties here.

You're the deciders.

14

You decide why.

facts.

You decide who.

You decide the

And I just want to

15 I read to you because it is your exclusive duty to determine the
16

facts in this case.

17 J believe the deputy.

You may not believe me.

You may not

You may not believe my client.

You may

18 J not believe Mr. Saunders, that doesn't matter. It matters as to
19 J how you go about believing what you believe and why and that
20

brings me to the next point.

21
22

I only put, very briefly, two witnesses on the stand,
okay?

That's not because I'm tired or we're lazy and we don't

23 I have any more things to say, but it has to do mainly with the
24

point that Judge Taylor lectured us about at the beginning of

25 J selecting the jury and he explained to us, that this is America
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1 I and in Anierio.i i :ie detendant doesn't even have to take the
2

stand, let along prove his innocent

3 !

*~t because we

4 ' does:

to"

;,oi '* * r

^ f *& ain:^: 4

.*.

5 i ^iiow,

i i i nave to

It's

fane/ case

'> •

...

,r

^"

i Lanc^ Ccise.

6 '

A

i-V M- , :'t<.: A .n — - ^

7

to asK -

.,cr *w

8

and thai *db, \. .. refuse,: : / i

9

^^ns: y ^

,

• * ~.

10 I . u.tm_. r-vtii.

-

th.s?

mere

-**

n;> final question

Yes

I

„:.J: .e limittea r , /on -:r

incriminatory t tiros

^ admit 4- m

:

o's

He a on ' • -

m-.-.. m e

f

11

can

12

ri'il. a crime but still it's consistent with what the neni'y

13

said.

14

c. -u -

15

the deputy an 1 ' said, n

16

S" :-

17

beneficial for you to take the test

18

very emjrhaf i/..-a 1 !

. tn

wc lests wii.cn is

He admit tod to d I i ' h^ r iti""iqc and the only thin-; he
.

* :en rie gets t: rue police station.
-*•-• mr «

.-.-now, telling Mr.

. J.. *,w, something to the effect that it would be
IV

lie in fact,

~>ay:; ' ha*" he never asreed any other questions

JM I except what's in there in the form. ± "'vink. • J n.-iv« i copy of
i
20 ! it to take. That seem -t little stranae to me, you know
I
! ' think tuat we/re nnt robots.

You'rp - *

iot

i

22

computers.

23

when we Laik about this and that, so whose telling th^ truth

24 | here/

We' m

I'm n

hum,in b^iru.,

*-! " "

y

-

WIH-II

.

25 J recol lect ±or._ c :o aiiterei.t. nere.

we talk about the Jazz,

-t saving their
Remember, our job is iu; ""0
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1 I prove that the deputy is lying.

Our job is to ask you, is

2

there a reasonable doubt here as to the whole totality of the

3

circumstances.

Who is telling us the truth?

4

Mr. Stark says that the deputy asked him at the jail,

5

you know, do you want to take the intoxilyzer test? His answer,

6

no.

7

was no?

8

good guy, I was not, you know, I was not difficult - and I

9

asked him, was he difficult with you?

Then I asked him, why did you take it then if the answer
And he says, because the deputy had told me I was a

No, he wasn't.

10

Consistent.

11

me that it might help me.

12

influence and it might help me. All right.

13

the instruction of the elements.

14

something that is, you know, written in stone or whatever, but

15

it bothers me.

16

shouldn't let those kinds of things happen and today you are

17

the law.

18

client or convict him because a Martian told you yesterday that

19

I was (inaudible).

20

not asking you to pay attention to the circumstances.

21

be easy if it was just a matter of adding two plus two equals

22

four and we get out of here in minutes, but we have a greater

23

picture to deal with.

24

Consistency all along and then he says and he told
He didn't think I was under the
That may not be in

That may not be, you know,

I hope it bothers you that, you know, we

You're suppose to obey.

You're suppose to acquit my

That's not the law, within reason.

I am
It would

In that regard, instruction #31, the Judge read to

25 J you, it says the presumption of innocence goes with Mr. Stark
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and it.':; hi „ daunders burden >c rr:ve tha~
2

must not prove it like *

3

d

4

if you imagine there is an : t- •

5
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the evidence, shouiu
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8
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9

pres'ump1

he

th<- ,awsuit.
" :.e scales Lin^ way, okay,

10

and the government has to put on enough w^iqht

11

imaginary son l. i . • i i II

12

beyond a reasonable dour

13

evidence or to

14

.-<iuse of seme- convoluted tnink^n ; process.

15

• h^nK reason, * T '

16

• *-

17

arove the vph^^le unsafei\

18

I-'

19

m a c m n - , w:ti; a •<---- •-.'

20

off:"-

21

wtai t..t government's ca:"^ is ar M r .

22
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'i"ii tiidt

'mat's what; it means, presumption
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to
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ne aoesn' t have to prove that M i . ' h drk
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t
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and the other

he magic iitr.ie numner there, that the
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'Hay.

That's

,:,o> testimony by the deputy

23

t-~t^:.*-, consistent, n e c e s s a n l v F .

24

certified. You

n *

25

ma y

/* - quioo 1 e a 1 i 111 e r; _ t with the polirv « - f t i ce r s

mea^
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_..at means, what it may or
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1 i as to you know, (inaudible) would you do this, would you do
2

I

that and you know, to some extent that may be a little

3

exaggerated.

4

but I can look into the (inaudible) hard client and defend

5

somebody or get a date with somebody because I have to abide by

6

the law.

7

an attorney, I have to be interviewed.

8

things and I'm asking you here, to uphold the part of the vow.

9

You can't ignore one and chose the other and that's why we're

10
11

The real point is, you know, I may be very smart,

I have to take the test;

I have to, you know, to be
I have to do all those

here.
I submit to you that if the government's case is

12

about that little magic number, you know, that that's not so,

13

they haven't got the common item at all, .093. Okay.

14

human beings.

15

recollections.

16

didn't drive for a mile.

He noticed - you know, he was waiting

17

for the light to change.

He starts driving.

18

speed, he noticed the flat tire, pulls over.

19

pulled over because the cop was behind him, nothing like that

20

according to the testimony.

21

maybe two, one and half, whatever we're quibbling about and I

22

suppose that had everything gone well, according the book or

23

according to how things should be, we probably wouldn't be

24

trying this case.

25

We make mistakes.

We're

We have different

My client has been through the system.

He

As he picked up
It's not as if he

He admitted to drinking a beer,

But we're here because that did not happen.

We ask you to believe that the government has in fact
111
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11
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12
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13
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14
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17
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18
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19

Deputy

20
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go
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